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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
IN THE MAT·TER OF THE ESTATE 
OF 
GERTRUDE LOUISE RICHARDS, 
DECEASED. 
CATHERINE R. HOWELL, CATHER-
INE S. CRESS and CHARLES 
RICHARD SCHNEIDER, 
Contestants and Respondents. 
v. 
JANET R. PARKER, 
Proponent and Appellant, 





BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Since appellant's Statement of Facts is for the most 
part conclusions drawn from conflicting evidence, it does 
not furnish a proper background for an understanding of 
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the questions to be determined. Also this statement is inac-
curate and misleading in several important particulars. 
The codicil which was denied probate is dated June 
25. It was signed in the Holy Cross Hospital where the 
testatrix had been confined critically ill for more than a 
month. She died on June 30. It was drafted by Mr. Morten-
sen, the assistant trust officer of the Walker Bank, without 
any previous contact or consultation with the testatrix (R. 
195-6). It was prepared for the purpose of correcting what 
Mr. Mortensen decided upon his own motion was a mistake 
made in a codicil which the testatrix had executed on June 
22 (R. 180). It corrected this mistake by revoking a prior 
bequest to Mrs. Howell and the children of her deceased 
sister, Eleanor R. Schneider, of one-half of the residue of 
the testatrix's property, and giving the entire residue to 
Mrs. Janet R. Parker. 
The last will of Gertrude Louise Richards was executed 
over eight years prior to her death. A copy of it was kept 
in her home, and the original in her safety deposit box in 
the Walker Bank (R. 133). It was prepared by James A. 
Stump, who had been her attorney since about 1928 (R. 
363-4). 
The will disposed of the bulk of the testatrix's estate 
as it would have passed by the laws of succession of this 
State. One-half of the residue was given to her sister, Janet 
Richards Parker, and the other one-half "to my said nieces, 
Catherine Richards Howell and Eleanor Richards Schneider, 
only children of my deceased brother, Charles Edward 
Richards." The only beneficiaries under the will who were 
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not her heirs were the three sons of Mrs. Parker, and a 
housekeeper who was given a small bequest. The testatrix 
made certain that no one except those of the Richards blood 
should receive any of her property other than the small 
gift to the housekeeper. 
The will appointed the testatrix's sister to be executrix, 
and if she failed to act, Walker Bank & Trust Company 
should be executor. Mr. Stump was one of the subscribing 
witnesses. 
The niece, Eleanor Richards Schneider, predeceased 
the testatrix, having died in September, 1953, (R. 390). As 
indicated above, the will provided that in such event, Mrs. 
Schneider's children should succeed to the bequests of their 
mother. 
The codicil of June 25, cancels the bequest to Eleanor 
Richards Schneider of the rugs, jewelry, paintings, etc., 
described in paragraph 8 of the will, giving as the reason 
for this cancellation the death of Eleanor. Since the bequest 
of the rugs, jewelry, etc., to Eleanor failed on account of 
her death and her children were substituted for her by 
paragraph 13 of the will, the cancellation of the bequest 
of the property described in paragraph 8 may well be 
compared to the act of kicking a corps·e. 
The remaining provisions of the codicil of June 25, 
revoke the bequest in the will of the residuary estate, and 
give it all to Mrs. Parker, except $10,000.00 to Mrs. Howell, 
and a like amount to the children of Mrs. Schneider. In 
view of the fact that the bulk of the estate fell into the 
residue, the codicil of June 25, would virtually disinherit 
Mrs. Howell and the children of Mrs. Schneider. 
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It revoked the appointment of Mrs. Parker as execu-
trix, and affirmatively appointed Walker Bank & Trust 
Company as executor. Since the will appointed the Bank 
as executor if for any reason Mrs. Parker did not act, the 
second appointment of the Bank by the codicil would appear 
to indicate a double intention to have the Bank act. 
The contested codicil is but one of three such documents 
playing an important role in this contest. 
The first of these was dated June 22, and was drawn 
by the trust officer of the Bank. The original was destroyed 
by Mr. Carlson (R. 138), and all copies of it by Mr. Athol 
Rawlins and by Mr. Mortensen (R. 348 and 198). No vestige 
of it remained at the time of trial (R. 138). The witnesses, 
however, were positive as to its contents (R. 134). It made 
two bequests, one of $10,000.00 to Mrs. Howell and a like 
sum to the children of Mrs. Schneider (R. 349). It revoked 
the appointment of Mrs. Parker as executrix (R. 346). It 
did not revoke any of the bequests in the will (R. 136-7). 
This instrument was executed in accordance with all for-
malities required to make a valid codicil (R. 344-5). Mr. 
Clarlson and Mr. Rawlins attested the same as witnesses 
(R. 138). The latter testified that he read the document 
and explained its provisions to the testatrix, and that she 
stated it expressed her wishes (R. 347). 
According to appellant's brief, there was "some con-
fusion" in the Bank the morning after the codicil of June 
22, was executed. It is said that this confusion was brought 
about by the fact that the Bank did not have the 1946 will 
(Page 7). Contrary to appellant's statement, the "confu-
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sion" of which she speaks was caused by the fact that it 
did have a copy of this will. Mrs. Parker brought it to the 
Bank on the morning of June 23 (R. 139 and 204). When 
it is considered how the codicil of June 22, cut down the 
benefits awarded to Mrs. Parker by the will, and increased 
the benefits awarded to Mrs. Howell and the children of 
l\frs. Schneider, there is no difficulty whatever in finding 
the source of the "confusion" in the Bank. 
Mr. IVIortensen testified that after Iv.irs. Parker gave 
him a copy of the will he immediately began to "wonder if 
the codicil (of June 22) was intended to revoke any of the 
provisions of the will" (R. 179). 
There was not a word in the codicil of June 221 to 
indicate any intention to revoke any of the provisions of 
the will. Furthermore, Miss Richards never indicated to 
any one at any time that she wished to cancel or revoke any 
of the provisions of the will, except the appointrnent of 
Mrs. Parker as executrix. 
The further statement in appellant's brief to the effect 
that "Mr. Car I son had been instructed by ~vi iss Richards 
on June 22, 1954, to prepare a codicil for Miss Richards' 
signature, giving to lVIrs. Howell only $10,000.00 and only 
$10,000.00 to the children of Eleanor Schneider" is in 
direct conflict with the evidence. Mr. Carlson testified that 
his instruction from Miss Richards was to prepare a codicil 
giving Mrs. Howell $10,000.00 and $10,000.00 to the children 
of Eleanor Schneider (R. 133). The word only was never 
mentioned by Miss Richards to him (R. 133). To rnake sure 
that he understood her instructions, Mr. Carlson reduced 
them to writing at the time (R. 134). Of course, this vv-riting 
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was destroyed before the trial, but Mr. Carlson was positive 
that the word only was not in it (R. 134). He was equally 
positive that the testatrix never said or even intimated that 
she wished to cancel or revoke any of the bequests in the 
will. The codicil of June 22, was in strict accordance with 
the instructions given to him (R. 137). Furthermore, as 
has already been indicated, it was read and explained to 
Miss Richards by Mr. Rawlins, and she indicated that it 
expressed her wishes (R. 137). 
The word only in connection with the bequests of 
$10,000.00 to Mrs. Howell and $10,000.00 to the children of 
Mrs. Schneider was the creation of Mr. Mortensen. He crea-
ted it after Mrs. Parker visited the Bank on June 23, and 
as a result of his "wondering if the codicil was intended to 
revoke any of the provisions of the will" (R. 349). He did 
not contact Miss Richards to verify her intention not to 
revoke any of the provisions of the will, but sua sponte pre-
pared a new codicil which revoked the bequests to Mrs. 
Howell and the -children of Mrs. Schneider and gave vir-
tually the entire estate to Mrs. Parker. Of course, the new 
codicil threw a couple of small bones to Mrs. Howell and 
the children of Mrs. Schneider, but for all practical purposes 
it disinherited them. 
Mr. Mortensen took his draft of the codicil to Mr. 
Rawlins who had it retyped (R. 196). However, no sub-
stantive change in Mr. Mortensen's draft was made (R. 
343). It undoubtedly was dated June 24, because it was 
taken to the hospital on that day by Mr. Rawlins and Mr. 
Carlson. When they arrived at Miss Richards' room, she 
was evide·ntly in great distress (R. 140-1). 
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She was moaning and crying out, "but not exactly 
screaming" (R. 353). After waiting outside her room for 
a considerable period, they entered and proceeded to "pre-
pare" her for executing the new codicil (R. 141). Before 
this preparation began, Mr. Carlson said to her "Miss 
Richards, we made a mistake in the codicil, or we were 
informed that we made a mistake in the codicil, which we 
brought up here last Tuesday, and we have corrected that 
with another codicil. Now, I understand that what you 
want is simply to leave $10,000.00 to Mrs. Howell and 
$10,000.00 to the children of Mrs. Schneider, and that Mrs. 
Parker is to get the entire residue" (R. 353-4). Mr. Carlson 
does not inform us as to how he discovered that "we" had 
made a mistake in the codicil of June 22, but it is certain 
that Miss Richards did not inform them of any mistake in 
the codicil of June 22, because she was never consulted nor 
contacted by anyone after the June 22, codicil had been 
signed (R. 193-4). 
After the crying out or screaming had subsided a little, 
a table was moved over in front of the bed, and the codicil 
of June 24, was placed upon it (R. 354). They tried to lift 
her up so that she could sign, but they had a lot of diffi-
culty (R. 354). Mr. Rawlins' arm got tired from holding 
Miss Richards, and it was necessary to lay her back and 
then raise her up again (R. 354). She continued to cry 
out the words "sign, sign, sign," (R. 354). They handed her 
the pen, but she failed to hold it (R. 354). Mr. Rawlins in-
structed Mr. Carlson to get a nurse to aid Miss Richards 
(R. 355). He left the room and returned with Dr. Galligan 
(R. 355). The latter appeared to ask Miss Richards some 
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questions in private, after which, he nodded his head and 
left the room ( R. 355) . ''We started again to see if Miss 
Parker (evidently Miss Richards) couldn't execute this 
will." "We finally got her up," and Mr. Rawlins put the pen 
in her hand, with his hand over hers (R. 355). She had 
two fingers and her thumb over the pen and Mr. Rawlins 
was helping her hold it (R. 355). He instructed her two 
or three times to "close your fingers" but there was no 
response (R. 355). Mr. Rawlins then turned to Mr. Carlson 
and remarked "Now I am to be a witness to this codicil" 
and "I am not satisfied that she knows what I am telling 
her and I said I can't sign this codicil as a witness" (R. 
355). "That was final" as far as he was concerned (R. 
356). 
The next day, the codicil of June 24, was redrafted by 
Mr. Jones (R. 352). It was dated June 25. With the ex-
ception of possibly some corrected errors in spelling, it was 
identical to the document which the testatrix was unable 
to sign the preceding day. It was taken by Mr. Jones, 
Mr. Carlson, and Mr. Mortensen to the hospital for 
execution by Miss Richards. When they arrived at the sick 
room, Miss Richards was unconscious (R. 108). According 
to their testimony, she regained consciousness and signed 
the document. 
The proponents of the codicil introduced no evidence 
other than that of the attesting witnesses and Mr. Morten-
sen. Although in the pretrial proceedings they informed 
the court and counsel that they would call Dr. Galligan as 
a witness, they made no arrangement for his appearance 
at the trial and did not call him as a witness. They 
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also designated Mrs. Parker as a witness but she did not 
testify. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the contestants moved 
the court to amend the pretrial order to embrace the issue 
of whether the codicil of June 25, was procured by the 
undue influence of Mrs. Janet Parker and the employees of 
Walker Bank. The motion was. predicated upon the ground 
that the evidence introduced without obje·ction was suffi-
cient to raise the issue. Contestants did not request any 
leave to reopen or introduce any additional evidence upon 
the enlarged issue. The motion was denied. 
The issue of testamentary capacity was submitted upon 
special interrogatories to which no objection was made by 
the proponents of the codicil. They did not request the 
court to submit any further or additional issue, and the 
court made no finding of any fact beyond or in addition 
to the fact determined by the special verdict. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE HOSPITAL R·ECORDS WERE PROPERLY 
AD~IITTED IN EVIDENCE. 
POINT II. 
NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN ALLOWING 
DR. CURRIER TO DEFINE SENILITY. 
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POINT III. 
NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN PERMIT-
TING DR. CURRIER TO ANSWER HYPOTHET-
ICAL QUESTIONS. 
POINT IV. 
THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DR. CURRIER 
WAS NOT UNDULY RESTRICTED. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING T'O 
INSTRUCT THE JURY UPON THE BURDEN 
OF PROOF. 
POINT VI. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT THE JURY'S FINDING THAT THE TES-




THE HOSPITAL RECORDS WERE PROPERLY 
ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE. 
Appellant faintly contends that the hospital records 
(Ex. C-3) were not admissible in evidence, because a suffi-
cient foundation was not established. No attempt is made 
to point out any particulars in which the foundation is 
insufficient. 
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Exhibit 3-C was properly identified as the record of 
Gertrude Louise Richards during her confinement in the 
Holy Cross Hospital from May 21, 1954,. until her death 
on the following June 30. This record was. in the permanent 
custody of the librarian of the hospital. It was prepared 
in the usual course of business of the hospital. The entries 
were made coincident with the event and by the attending 
physicians, internes, nurses, laboratory technicians, and 
other employees who participated in the examination, treat-
ment, care, and attention of the patient. It consists of the 
history given by the patient to the attending physician at 
the time of admission to the hospital, the report of his 
physicial examination made at that time, the laboratory 
reports of blood tests, reports of the x-ray examinations, 
and various other tests, the doctor's progress notes, his 
orders for treatment, temperature charts, the nurses' re-
ports of their bedside attendance, and the attending physi-
cian's final diagnosis, and cause of death. Some entries bear 
no signature of the person making them, and it was impos-
sible to determine whether all of the parties who partici-
pated in the preparation of the record were still employed 
by the hospital or were available as witnesses. 
Dr. Galligan, who was the attending physician in charge 
of the case, certified the record as being correct. He ex-
amined it daily, and relied upon it in his treatment of the 
patient. He testified at length without objection of appel-
lant, concerning the condition of the patient during her 
last illness, and used the hospital record as a means 
of refreshing his recollection. Some entries were made 
by him personally, and others by Dr. Copeland, an in-
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terne, acting under his direction. The interne was also 
at the hospital during decedent's last illness, and testi~ 
fied as to her condition during this period. He relied 
upon his entries in the record to refresh his recollec-
tion. No objection was made to this use of the records, 
or to the testimony of the interne other than that it was 
privileg.ed, which objection was expressly withdrawn. 
The foregoing circumstances constitute firm founda-
tion for admitting the hospital record_ in evidence. This 
court wisely has vested in the trial judge almost unlimited 
power to determine what is sufficient basis for the admis-
sion in evidence of entries such as hospital records. 
"It is the prerogative of the trial court to de-
termine when such foundation is laid and sufficient 
showing of the credibility of the evidence is estab-
lished." State v. Davie, . . . Utah ... , 240 P. 2d 
265; G. S. Wood Mercantile Co., etc., v. Dougall, ... 
Utah ... , 114 P. 2d 202. 
Appellant's real contention with respect to the hospital 
record is that it is not admissible in evidence under any 
exception to the hearsay rule, and that an act of the legis-
lature is necessary to authorize the use of such records as 
evidence. 
We submit that this court has held otherwise. It is 
true that in Clayton v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany, 96 Utah 331, 85 P. 2d 819, the ruling of the trial court 
refusing to admit a hospital record in evidence was sus-
tained. However, this ruling was upheld solely upon the 
ground that a proper foundation for admission of the hos-
pital record had not been laid. This court expressly decided 
that hospital records were admissible in evidence as entries 
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made in the usual course of business. That such is the 
decision in the Clayton case is recognized in State v. Davie, 
... Utah ... , 240 P. 2d 263. See also N orthcrest Inc. v. 
vValker Bank & Trust Company, etc., ... Utah ... , 248 P. 
2d 2692; Alder v. Clark, ... Utah ... , 251 P. 2d 669. 
Since the Clayton case was decided, the legislature has 
enacted a Public Health Code. Section 26-15-58, U. C. .P1.. 
1953, requires hospitals to be licensed. As a condition to 
obtaining a license, the hospital must keep a clinical record 
of each patient. The items of this record are specified in 
detail. Ex. C-3 contains all of them. 
Section 26-15-82 makes it a misdemeanor for any one 
to fraudulently alter any such clinical record or knowingly 
make any false entry therein. 
It is submitted that hospital records are novv required 
by law, and should be admissible as are other public records 
of private writings .. 
Regardless of the present status of hospital records, 
the Public Health Code places an additional guaranty upon 
their reliability. 
No other type of evidence has anything like the assur-
ance of trustworthiness that hospital records possess. rrhere 
could be no motive whatever for falsification by any of 
the persons who make the entries, and the likelihood of 
error is rather remote. This is so because as Vvigmore 
points out, "they are made and relied upon in affairs of 
life and death." The attending physician relies upon and 
follows them religiously in his treatment of the patient. 
Such strong guaranties of reliability are entirely lacking 
in the case of book entries made in the regular course of 
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commercial transactions which are universally admitted 
in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. 
We are aware that some commentators and text writ~ 
ers have cited decisions which are said to hold that hospital 
records are inadmissible in evidence in the absence of stat-
ute. An examination of these cases reveals that in a great 
majority of them the hospital record involved contained 
entries which had no reference to the medical treatment 
or history of the patient, or it contained privileged infor-
mation. In some of these cases, the entries covered opinions 
based solely on other opinions, and in others a proper foun-
dation was not established. We have found no case of 
modern origin in which a hospital record made in the usual 
course of business, properly identified and authenticated 
has been held to be inadmissible when it consisted solely 
of unprivileged information pertaining to the care, treat-
ment, and condition of the patient. 
Even if we did not have the Clayton case or our Public 
Health Code, there should be no hesitancy in holding that 
hospital records such as Exhibit C-3 are admissible in evi-
dence as an exception to the hearsay rule. As Wigmore 
points out, to reject such records would be "a reproach to 
the common law." See Wigmore on Evidence, Third Edi-
tion, Vol. VI, Section 1707. 
POINT II. 
NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN ALLOWING 
DR. CURRIER TO DEFINE SENILITY. 
Point 2 of appellant's brief does not assert any error 
of the trial court, nor any proposition of law which, if 
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adopted by this court, would require any modification of 
the judgment appealed fro1n. There is not even any discus ... 
sion under Point 2 of any legal principle. 
Nearly eight pages of the brief are devoted to berating 
and abusing Dr. Currier. About the only departure from this 
abuse is a most disrespectful, if not contemptuous, remark 
concerning the trial judge. 
\ 
The spring board for this tirade against Dr. Currier 
is the ruling of the trial court allowing him to define senil-
ity. Appellant distorts his definition into all sorts of vi-
tuperation. It is said to be a "vicious and unwarranted 
statement not supported by the record," a "'brazen disre-
gard of the record," a "reflection upon the integrity of Dr. 
Copeland's testimony," an indelible "stamp" on Miss Rich-
ards "with the odium of mental senility by a distortion of 
the observation made by Dr. Copeland." 
. Appellant's counsel appear to have undergone a change 
of mind, since the question under consideration was pro-
pounded in the trial court. His objection to it there was 
"It is a generalized statement. It is theory. We might be 
here a long time listening to this kind of discourse. The 
question is not directed to anything having to do with Miss 
Richards." (Page 19, Appellant's Brief.) All this is now 
changed, and the question and answer are given an entirely 
different import. 
The objection made that the question was. not directed 
to anything having to do with Miss Richards was, of course, 
correct, since it called simply for the definition of a medical 
term. The answer of Dr. Currier was confined strictly to 
definition. 
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We submit that appellant's counsel misinterpret the 
testimony of Dr. Copeland with respect to senility. Dr. 
Copeland did not define senility. He did find from observa-· 
tion and exa.minatibn that Miss Richards was senile upon 
her last admission to the hospital. He did not say that the 
senility which he found upon examination did not involve 
mental deterioration. On the contrary, his testimony clearly 
implies that he did include mental failure in his finding 
of senility. He stated, "this has a connotation of both phys-
ical and mental senility" (R. 230). 
That it was proper to permit the Doctor to explain 
senility, we refer to Parker v. Granger, 52 P. 2d 226, 230, 
4 Calif. 2d 468. 
It is almost inconceivable that appellant could have 
been prejudiced, even if the answer were inadmissible. 
POINT III. 
NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN PERMIT-
TING DR. CURRIER TO ANS\VER HYPOTHET-
ICAL QUESTIONS. 
Point 3 of appellant's brief contains no statement of 
any legal point relied upon for a reversal of the judgment. 
It consists primarily of a continuation of the slander of 
Dr. Currier. This court is invited to scrutinize "substan-
tially every answer that he gave" and stamp them as hav-
ing no probative value·. 
Dr. Currier's answer with respect to the effect of 
decedent's heart condition upon her mental processes is 
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singled out for special criticism, but no claim is made that 
any error was committed in receiving it or allowing it to 
stand. As a matter of record, the appellant made no ob-
jection to the question, except that of remoteness, an ob-
jection which was completely exploded by Drs. Copeland 
and Galligan who testified that the decedent's heart condi-
tion became progressively worse up to the time of death. 
Dr. Currier also stated that the heart condition described 
- ~ ~ ' • r 
in the question would not change over a per~od of one month, 
meaning, of course, that it would not improve. 
The assertion now made by the appellant that the 
Qpinion of Dr. Currier to the effect that the heart condi-
tion described in the hypothetical question would cause a 
diminution in the supply of blood to the brain and a conse-
quent impairment of the mental process was of no probative 
value because it was based upon the opinions of others 
involves a misconception of the record. The condition stated 
in the question was that revealed by an x-ray examination 
of the decedent's heart on May 24, preceding her death. 
This x-ray disclosed that the heart was grossly enlarged 
with the apex almost reaching the lateral chest wall. This 
condition was not a matter of opinion of anyone. On the 
contrary, it was a demonstrated fact. Anyone who could 
read an x-ray could see the diseased heart. Furthermore, 
there was no question at all but that the decedent had suf-
fered from a diseased heart over a period of years. Both 
Dr. Copeland and Dr. Galligan so testified. It was a direct 
cause of her death. 
The distinction between fact and opinion is extremely 
difficult to make, and as Wigmore points out has no value 
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in determining what is a proper foundation for the opinion 
of an expert, Volume II, Section 682-d. That distinguished 
author further exposes the fallacy in the statement of some 
courts that an opinion of an expert cannot be based upon 
opinions expressed by other experts. 
"There is no mysterious logical fatality in bas-
ing one expert opinion upon another. It is done every 
day in business and in applied science." Wigmore 
on Evidence, Third Edition, Volume II, Section 
682-d. 
Appellant also states that the hypothetical question 
upon which Dr. Currier expressed his opinion that the de-
cedent did not have sufficient mental capacity to make any 
decision' of lasting or serious importance was based upon 
"glaring distortions of the record." None of these so-called 
glaring distortions was mentioned in the trial court. Ap-
pellant's counsel there made only the general objection that 
the question was incompetent, irrelevant, and i:rnmaterial 
and no proper foundation laid (R. 317). It is a complete 
answer to appellant's present complaint to point out that 
this objection is too general to present anything for review 
by this court. In Culmer v. Clift, 14 Utah 291, 47 Pac. 85, 
it is held that an objection, such as was made by appellant, 
is too vague to put the court below in error. 
"The objection did not point out the ground 
upon which it was made, and therefore does not 
merit consideration. The point of the objection 
should have been particularly stated, in order to 
entitle it to consideration. This is the uniform rule. 
General objections to the admission of evidence are 
unavailable to the party making them, either on 
motion for new trial or appeal. The particular 
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gr~unds of the objection must be stated, so that the 
trial court may understand the nature of the objec-
tion before passing upon it," citing numerous cases~ 
See also Wigmore on Evidence, Third Edition, Volume 
I, Section 18. 
Although appellant's objection was insufficient, we are 
quite willing to meet head-on the charge that the hypotheti-
cal question is predicated upon distortions of the record. 
One of the asserted "distortions" is that the hypotheti-
cal question assumes without evidence that at the time the 
codicil was signed the heart had deteriorated to the point 
where there was fluid in the lungs. 
The record discloses that there was fluid in her lungs 
practically all of the time she was in the hospital, and that 
the lung fluid was due to the congestive heart failure (R. 
227). There was a "back-flow" of blood resulting in an 
accumulation of fluid (R. 227). This "back-flow" with 
resulting fluid in the lungs, became increasingly worse up 
to the moment of death. The hospital record discloses the 
sound of rales at practically every examination of the tes-
tatrix. Rales are, of course, the indication of fluid in the 
lungs (R. 241). The significance of it is that it directly 
affects the functioning of the brain. It was, therefore, an 
important element in the hypothetical question. The evi-
dence to sustain it was abundant. 
There is also an objection to the hypothetical question 
upon the ground that there is no evidence that the testatrix 
was unable to control bowel movements at the time the 
codicil was signed, or that she was nauseated, or that she 
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was vomiting, or that she was falling out of bed, or that 
oxygen was being administered. The short answer to this 
belated objection is that the question did not assume that 
all of these events were transpiring at the very moment 
the codicil was being signed. A cursory reading of the 
question reveals the meaning that these conditions were 
manifest at intervals during her last confinement in the 
hospital. 
The evidence fully justified the assumption of each 
of these symptoms and conditions. For instance, on the 
very morning of June 25, the hospital record discloses two 
involuntary bowel movements (Ex. C-3, Page 7 4). Other 
instances are reported in the nurse's bedside notes. (See 
Ex. C-3, Pages 73, 75, 76.) This condition of the testatrix 
has an important bearing upon her mental condition. There 
was no pathology or physical derangement that would 
explain the lack of control of the bowels. She had no control 
over her bowels for the same reason that a small child does 
not have such control, viz. inability to form any volition 
in the matter. 
The record is replete with instances of nausea and 
vomiting, both before and during her stay in the hospital. 
(Ex. C-3, Pages 2, 18, 19, 44, 47, 48, 53, 54.) These ex-
periences sapped her strength and vitality, and made it 
practically impossible for her to take nourishn1ent by mouth 
(R .... ) . Furthermore, vomiting· is a forerunner of dia-
betic coma (R. 278). 
There was also evidence to indicate that she fell out 
of bed, and that side rails were placed on her bed to prevent 
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these accidents (Ex. C-3, Pages 19 and 44). She fell out 
of bed because she was delirious or disoriented. 
That it was necessary to administer oxygen to her was 
not only proved (Ex. C-3), but would follow from her con-
gestive heart failure. We do not need any expert to tell us 
that a deficiency of oxygen has a marked effect upon the 
mental processes. 
Some point is claimed that the hypothetical question 
did not incorporate appellant's interpretation of the evi-
dence with respect to the mental condition of the testatrix 
on June 25. Even if these theories were within some aspect 
of the evidence, respondent was at liberty to ignore them 
in the question for the reason pointed out in Palmquist v. 
Mine & Smelter Supply Company, 25 Utah 257, at page 
263, 70 Pac. 994, and in Lindsay Land & Live Stock CO'. v. 
Smart Land & Live Stock Co., 43 Utah 559, 137 Pac. 839: 
"That is, the party producing the expert and 
propounding the question may do so upon his own 
theory of the case, and so long as he sufficiently 
reflects the evidence which goes to establish his 
theory, the question is not objectionable upon the 
ground that all the evidence in the case is not re-
flected in the question." 
See also Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. First National Building 
Co., 89 Utah 456, 57 P. 2d 1099; Carter v. Standard Ace. 
Ins. Co., 65 Utah 462, 238 Pac. 259; Jackson v. Harries, 65 
Utah 282, 236 Pac. 234, and Johanson v. Huntsman, 60 Utah 
402, 209 Pac. 197. 
Appellant's complaint that the hypothetical question 
injected Dr. Currier's definition of senility, and that there 
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was no evidence that decedent was senile, that would in any 
way reflect on her mental competency on June 25, involves 
a distortion of the question. The assumption in the question 
was simply "that she is senile." Dr. Copeland stated in his 
report of the history of the testatrix upon her last admis-
sion to the hospital that she was senile. He testified that 
he used the word senile to mean a physical condition with 
a mental connotation (R. 230). In this coimection it was 
found that the testatrix was afflicted "rith an advanced 
stage of arteriosclerosis, or hardening of the arteries (R. 
229), which was evident upon palpitation (R. 229). The 
arteriosclerosis was a cause of death. It had a marked effect 
upon the mental process, because it impaired the supply of 
blood to the brain. 
Appellant discounts the testimony of Dr. Currier, be-
cause some of his opinions were not expressed in a dog-
matic manner. Certain parts of his answers are taken out 
of their context and cited as rendering the opinions con-
jectural and speculative. The expressions "I would expect" 
and "I suppose you might say" and "it would seem to me 
highly unlikely" quoted on page 28 of appellant's brief 
when detached from the remaining testimony and "followed 
slavishly" admittedly detracts somewhat fron1 the positive-
ness of the· Doctor's conclusion. But as pointed out by this 
court in Moore v. The Denver and Rio Grande Western Rail-
road Company (not yet reported) such: 
"Words must be taken within the context of the 
testimony in determining the meaning and value of 
the evidence. * * * 
"This court has long recognized that the mere 
use of words such as 'belief,' 'impression,' 'proba-
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bility,' or 'possibility' will not exclude a witness's 
testimony where his expression does not indicate a 
lack of personal observation, but merely the degree 
of positiveness of his original observation of the 
facts or the degree of positiveness of his recollec-
tion." Citing Jackson v. Harries, 65 Utah 282, 236 
Pac. 234; Picino v. Utah-Apex Mining Co., et al., 52 
Utah 338, 173 Pac. 900; Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 102 Utah 26, 126 P. 2d 1070. 
POINT IV. 
THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DR. CURRIER 
WAS NOT UNDULY RESTRICTED. 
Respondents freely confess that a wide latitude must 
oe granted in the cross-examination of an expert witness, 
such as Dr. Currier who had not seen or examined the tes-
tatrix; that a broad inquiry into his knowledge, training 
and experience in the particular subject may be made, and 
that his conclusions may be fully tested by requiring his 
opinion based upon any interpretation of the evidence, or 
u·pon any fact or combination of facts different from or in 
addition to the state of facts assumed in the hypothetical 
question. See Carter v. Insurance Company, supra. 
Appellant's counsel did not see fit to test Dr. Currier's 
opinion by ascertaining what it might be if predicated 
upon any fact or state of facts. omitted from the hypotheti-
cal question. He contented himself with an inquiry into 
the Doctor's experience. He was in no way limited in 
cross-examining Dr. Currier within any of the bounds 
above outlined. The sole question, which was not al-
lowed, was one asking him to compare the weight of 
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pis opinion with th~t of the testatrix's attenqing physi-
cian. We submit that the question was clearly improper 
and was not designed to bring out any information which 
would be of any aid whatsoever to the court or jury. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING T·O 
INSTRUCT THE JURY UPON THE BURDEN 
OF PROOF. 
The issue of testamentary capacity was submitted to 
the jury upon special interrogatories as follows: 
"The jury is directed to place a cross opposit~ 
the proposition below with which it agrees based 
upon the law and evidence of this case. 
"PROPOSITION 1. Gertrude Louise Richards 
at the time of making the codicil dated June 25, 1954, 
was of sound and disposing mind. 
( ) 
"PROPOSITION 2. Gerturde Louise Richards 
at the time of making the codicil dated June 25, 1954, 
was not of sound and disposing mind. 
( X ) 
"PROPOSITION 3. The evidence is so equally 
divided that the jurors cannot determine either prop-
osition 1 or proposition 2. 
( ) 
"Those jurors agreeing, please sign." 
No general verdict was permitted. 
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In thus submitting the issue, the court acted under 
Rule 49, U. R. C. P. The pertinent provisions of this rule 
are those which direct the court to give to the jury, 
"* * * such explanation and instruction 
concerning the matter thus submitted as may be 
necessary to enable the jury to make its findings 
upon each issue. If in so doing, the court omits any 
issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by the evi-
dence, each party waives his right to a trial by jury 
of the issue so omitted, unless before the jury re-
tires he demands its submission to the jury. As to 
an issue omitted without such demand, the court 
may make a finding, or if it fails to do so, it shall 
be deemed to have made a finding in accord with 
the judgment on the special verdict." 
The proponents. of the codicil made no complaint that 
any issue was omitted and the court made no additional 
finding. The court in its instructions required the jury to 
determine all questions of fact and to arrive at their de-
cision solely from the evidence, the admissions, and stipu-
lations of the parties during the trial. They were directed 
to determine the weight or convincing force of the evidence, 
also to carefully and conscientiously consider and compare 
all of the testimony and all of the facts and circumstances 
which might have a bearing on any issue and determine 
therefrom what the facts were. 
The first and second special interrogatories covered one 
issue, namely, testamentary capacity. The third proposition 
required them to indicate whether in their minds the evi-
dence was such that they could not make an affirmative 
finding upon either of the alternative propositions one or 
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two. In the event they found the evidence equally divided on 
either of the alternative issues, they were to so indicate. If 
they found affirmatively that would have ended their delib-
erations, and the court would have rendered judgment 
against the party having the burden of proof. But the 
jury impliedly found that the evidence was not equally 
divided. They expressly decided that the testatrix was not 
of sound and disposing mind. The occasion for instructing 
on the burden of proof never arose, because the jury having 
weighed the evidence, found that it was not equally divided. 
This case presents an excellent illustration of the effec-
tiveness of the special verdict under Rule 49. An instruc-
tion upon the burden of proof would have confused the jury 
in view of the manner in which the special interrogatories 
were formed. Only such explanation and instruction con-
cerning the matter submitted as may be necessary to enable 
the jury to make its findings is permitted. A clear-cut 
explanation of the law concerning the special matter was 
given in this case, and no exception to it is argued in appel-
lant's brief. 
Professor ~loore in his excellent work on Federal Prac-
tice (Volume 5, Second Edition, Page 2207) says of the 
federal rule, which is substantially the same as Rule 49: 
"Use of the special verdict eliminates the neces-
sity for and use of complicated instructions on the 
law, which are a normal concomitant of the general 
verdict. Complicated instructions have always been 
ludicrous and vicious: ludicrous in that only the 
naive can believe lay juries are capable of absorbing 
all the legal elen1ents involved ; vicious in that lack 
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of comprehension leads to confusion and ultimately, 
injustice. When the special verdict is used the court 
should give to the jury only such explanation and 
instructions as it deems necessary to enable the jury 
to make intelligent findings upon the issues of facts 
submitted." 
Even in cases where there is no special interrogatory 
directing the jury to so indicate if they find the evidence 
is evenly balanced, failure to instruct on burden of proof 
is not prejudicial error if the customary instructions on 
credibility of witnesses, weight of the evidence, etc., are 
given, and if the evidence will support the finding made 
by the jury. 
A typical case is Howard v. Britton, 71 Tex. 286, 9 S. 
W. 73, where it was said: 
"The legal evidence adduced fully authorized 
the finding in favor of the plaintiffs, and we can-
not see how a charge on the burden of proof would 
have in any way enlightened the jury as to the 
issues before them in this case, which is the only 
purpose of a charge." 
A similar result was reached in Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. 
Thorp, 125 Tex. 373, 83 S. W. 2d 658, in which the court 
commented: 
"The court gave the usual charge to the effect 
that the jury were the sole judges of the credibility 
of the witnesses, and the weight to be given their 
testimony, etc. Under these circumstances it is 
doubtful whether a charge on the burden of proof, 
in connection with the submission of the issue was 
necessary.'' 
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There is another sufficient reason why the court did 
not err in granting appellant's request for instruction ·on 
the burden of proof. Her counsel waived any right to com-
plain of such omission. 
Near the conclusion of the trial, the court called upon 
counsel for the parties to state their respective positions 
on the question of burden of proof. Contestants' counsel 
admitted that the burden of proof "is on me" (R. 423). 
Proponents' counsel, however, refused to concede that such 
burden was on the contestants. When asked by the trial 
judge to agree, he made the following stuttering answer: 
"THE COURT: And by your requested Instruc-
tion No. 11 you are of that opinion too apparently. 
"MR. GUSTIN: That is the burden of going 
forward. 
"THE COURT: Well, that is not what you say 
in your request No. 11, so I take it that I am in a 
minority and you gentlemen are agreed. 
"MR. GUSTIN: Well, we adhere to our re-
quested Instruction No. 11. 
"THE COURT: Then with that being true, I 
would say that Mr. Bagley has the right to open and 
close the argument, since that is the only issue I am 
going to submit to the jury. 
"MR. GUSTIN: And might the record show 
our objection and our exception, '\Ve claiming never-
theless the right to open and close on the argument. 
"THE COURT: All right, it may show that, 
and it may also show that if you gentlemen are 
right in the law, that I have been deceived as to the 
true status of the law and will fall into this error 
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at your instance and request, and I don't think you 
can take any advantage of me on that ground. 
"MR. GUSTIN: WeH, I appreciate the dilemma, 
and I can assure the court that it is not with any 
deliberate purpose of deceiving the court. 
"THE COURT: I am sure not. It's all right 
if you can anyway. I learn by being deceived" (R. 
423-4). 
It is clear that the proponent's counsel was primarily 
concerned with the right to open and close the argument 
to the jury. Being an experienced lawyer, he knew an 
instruction on the burden of proof meant nothing as a 
practical matter. It was the right to open and close 
the argument that was the vital matter to him. That right 
went to the party who had the burden of proof. Proponent's 
counsel had to make a clear-cut choice. He did not do so. 
Instead, he tried to ride with the hounds and hide with 
the hare. 
We submit that the jury was properly instructed as 
contemplated by Rule 49, and that the appellant is in no 
position to put the trial court in error in failing to 
instruct on the burden of proof. 
POINT VI. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT THE JURY'S FINDING THAT THE TES-
TATRIX WAS NOT OF SOUND AND DISPOS-
ING MIND. 
Since this is an action at law, the jury's verdict must 
be upheld, unless it is unreasonable in view of all of the 
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evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom when 
considered in the light most favorable to supporting the 
verdict. Hendee v. Walker Bank & Trust Company, Execu-
tor of the Estate of Wilda Gail Swan, Deceased, (not yet 
reported); In re Hansen's Will, 50 Utah 207, 167 Pac. 256; 
In re McCoy's Estate, 91 Utah 212, 63 P. 2d 620. 
This court has several times declared that a person 
does not have the necessary mental capacity to make a valid 
will, if at the time he is unable to remember who are the 
natural objects of his bounty, recall to mind the character 
and extent of his property, form some understandable plan 
for the disposition of his property, and keep such plan in 
mind long enough to execute it unaided and without sug-
gestion from others. In re Swan's Estate, 51 Utah 410, 170 
Pac. 452; In re Hanson's Estate, 87 Utah 580, 52 P. 2d 
1103; In re Butters' Estate, ... Utah ... , 261 P. 2d 171; 
Hendee v. Walker Bank, etc., supra. 
The trial court instructed the jury in accordance with 
this definition of testamentary capacity, and no objection 
or exception thereto has been made. The ultimate question 
of fact to be determined in this case may, therefore, be 
stated as follows : Did the testatrix possess a mind that 
retained full know ledge of the property she possessed and 
an intelligent understanding of the disposition she desired 
to make of it, and the persons that she desired to have it, 
with capacity to recollect and comprehend the nature of the 
claims of those excluded from participating in her bounty, 
a mind capable of exercising judgment, reason and delib-
eration, and of weighing the consequences of her codicil 
to a reasonable degree, and the effect of it upon her prop-
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erty and near relatives and of forming and executing a plan 
of disposition without suggestion from others. 
No other question is as difficult to prove as the condi-
tion of the human mind at a particular time and circum-
stance. There is no problem in determining the testarnen-
tary capacity of a person in vigorous health and full pos-
session of his faculties nor the lack of such capacity of an 
insane person. Between these two extremes, a conclusion of 
competency or incompetency can never be drawn with ab-
solute certainty. As pointed out by the Supreme Court of 
Iowa in Re Allison's Estate, 105 Iowa 130, 73 N. W. 489: 
"The conclusion depends much on the credit to 
be given to particular witnesses, not so much with 
reference to their veracity as with reference to their 
conclusions from observations and particular facts 
coming to their knowledge. The line between com-
petency, and incompetency, or that shows a testa-
mentary capacity, is always traced with uncertainty, 
and the findings in most cases are justified only 
as the best solution of a doubtful problem * * * 
However the facts might be found, there would be 
the conviction that it was doubtful. It is not to be 
properly said that the evidence is conclusive either 
way. With such conditions the finding of the jury 
should stand, and especially after the district court 
has declined to interfere." 
The evidence in this case fully sustains the determina-
tion of the jury that the testatrix was not competent to 
make a valid codicil at the time the rejected instrument is 
alleged to have been signed by her. 
She entered the hospital for the last time on May 23, 
1954, "acutely ill" (Ex. C-3, Page 3). She was suffering 
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from diabetes of some nine years duration, chronic con-
gestive heart failure, and arteriosclerosis. Her diabetic. 
condition "was very severe" and proved to be "very diffi-
cult to control" (R. 227). She "fluctuated from an extreme 
of diabetic coma on the one extreme to that of insulin shock 
on the other extreme, and she was very difficult to main-
tain in a balanced condition" (R. 227-8). The efforts of 
the doctors to maintain a balance were described as a "day 
to day battle," which they never won (R. 277). There 
were so many episodes of diabetic coma and insulin shock 
that it was virtually impossible to say when one began and 
the other ended (R. 278-9). The condition continued to 
deteriorate up to the time of death, with a definite down-
hill course following the "very stormy night" of June 21. 
On June 25, she was "more stuporous than before." She 
continued to fluctuate between diabetic acidosis and insulin 
shock, even though "continuous attention is paid to her 
urinary sugar and blood sugar" (Ex. C-3). 
This extremely severe diabetic condition ''"'"as aggra-
vated and complicated by the congestive heart failure, which 
was of long duration and so serious as to cause almost 
continuous. fluid in the lungs (R. 227). The heart was 
"grossly enlarged with the apex almost reaching to the 
lateral chest wall" (Ex. C-3). It appears that her doctors 
prescribed digitalis in an effort to relieve the heart failure. 
From this treatment there followed a very debilitating case 
of vomiting, vvhich greatly weakened her (R. 278). It was 
impossible for her to take food by mouth (R. 278). The 
failure of the heart made it necessary to give her oxygen 
(R .... ) , and caused considerable swelling of her extremi~ 
ties. It was a direct cause of her death. 
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The congestive heart failure had a direct bearing up?n 
her mental functioning, because the diseased heart could 
not pump a sufficient supply of blood to the brain ( R. 
238-9). It was impossible for the doctors to relieve the 
heart condition, because she suffered from a severe defi-
ciency of mineral in her system. "We could not correct this 
deficiency without disturbing the heart too much, so we 
corrected it to the point of danger, and then we had to stop" 
(R. 236). This mineral deficiency also directly impaired 
her mental processes, (R. 236) and was at a particularly 
low ebb on the day the contested codicil was signed (R. 
236). 
Another factor which seriously and directly impaired 
the testatrix's mental processes was the arteriosclerosis or 
hardening of the arteries ( R. 229) . This process was of 
long standing (R. 229). The arteries affected were those 
leading to the heart (R. 270). This disease is also given 
as one of the causes of death (Ex. C-3, Page 1) . 
None of the afflictions above described improved dur-
ing the patient's stay in the hospital. On the contrary, all 
of them grew progressively worse (R. 272). The day on 
which the codicil of June 25, was signed, was a particularly 
bad day for the testatrix. She was more stuporous than she 
had been previously. There was fluid in her I ungs, which 
itself produces a semi-comatose condition (R. 242). On the 
morning of this day, she experienced two involuntary bowel 
movements, indicating a complete loss. of volition (Ex. C-3). 
There is ample evidence to establish that the testatrix 
was in a state of coma when the subscribing witnesses and 
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Mr. Mortensen arrived at the hospital on June 25, and also 
to prove that she did not revive thereafter to the extent of 
being able to form or carry out any understandable plan 
for the disposition of her property. Admittedly, she was 
unconscious and no one could say that it was not a diabetic 
coma (R. 108). 
The so-called intravenous "feeding" given the testatrix 
soon after the gentlemen just mentioned arrived at the 
hospital is an extremely significant item of evidence. The 
"feeding" consisted of an injection of dextrose and potas-
sium chloride (R. 260). 
It is well known that dextrose is administered to a 
diabetic to bring the patient out of diabetic coma. There 
is danger that the afflicted person will die if something 
is not done to restore consciousness (R. 27 4) . Potassium 
chloride is also administered to a patient in a stupor or a 
semi-comitose condition caused by an insufficiency of min-
eral in the system. According to Dr. Copeland, the sole 
purpose of the intra venous feeding of dextrose and potas-
si urn chloride was to bring 1\liss Richards out of a coma 
or semi-comitose condition. 
"Q. What was the purpose of that? 
"A. The purpose was that we thought some 
of her stuperousness was the result of a potassium 
deficiency. We had done blood levels in the labora-
tory of the potassium in her blood. We found the 
potassi urn level to be significantly decreased, and 
we thought in talking this over among ourselves or 
the physicians, that this was a likely cause of her 
mental condition. We decided to replace some of her 
deficiency" (R. 261). 
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Convincing evidence of the testatrix's lack of testa-
mentary capacity is that which relates to the attempt of 
Mr. Rawlins a·nd Mr. Carlson to have her execute the codicil 
of June 24. On that day she was utterly incapable of exert-
ing any pressure whatever upon the pen that had been 
placed in her hand by Mr. Rawlins. Although he held her 
fingers on the pen, she did not have the strength to hold 
it. There was no mental response whatever to his instruc-
tion to hold the pen. Her mind was concerned primarily 
with her funeral. Her mumbling the words "sign, sign, 
sign" indicate a semi-conscious realization of a compelling 
necessity to execute the document. It was obvious to Mr. 
Rawlins that she lacked capacity to dispose of her property 
by will, and he declined to assume the role of an attesting 
witness. 
There is no evidence whatever that she rallied from the 
afflictions which were so desperate on June 24. She did 
not gather any strength of either body or mind during the 
interval between the visit of Mr. Rawlins and that of Mr. 
Jones. On the contrary, she continued to lose ground stead-
ily. 
The only possible explanation of the testimony of the 
attesting witnesses that she signed the rejected codicil 
without her hand being guided is that the injection of the 
dextrose and potassium chloride put some fleeting artificial 
strength in her hand. 
The events immediately preceding the signing of the 
June 25, codicil reveal most distinctly the lack of testamen-
tary capacity. The June 22, codicil, which was destroyed, is 
itself evidence of her incompetency at that time. It was a 
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most unnatural and confusing instrument. Other than 
appointing the Bank as executor, it contained no provision 
modifying or changing any of the provisions of the will. 
Still this instrument (according to the testimony of the 
subscribing witnesses) exactly expressed her wishes. Within 
the space of three days, another codicil is presented to her 
for her signature. Although its provisions differed violently 
from those of the codicil of June 22, she again (according 
to the testimony of the subscribing witnesses) indicates 
that it expressed her wishes exactly. 
Another striking item of evidence indicating the com-
plete deterioration of the testatrix's mental functions is 
the opening remark made by her to Mr. Carlson upon his 
first visit to the hospital. She is alleged to have stated that 
she had made "a great mistake in her will," and wanted to 
correct it. This obviously is the voice of an enfeebled in-
tellect. No rational mind would entertain such an idea. 
It is conceivable, of course, that if she had been mentally 
competent, she could have changed her mind concerning the 
disposition of her property, but it is difficult to conceive 
how she could have reached the conclusion that she had 
made a terrible mistake in her will. What mistake, terrible 
or other kind, could she find in a will which made a most 
fair and equitable distribution of her property among those 
who were nearest in blood to her? How did she propose 
to correct it? According to the codicil which she signed the 
next day, the only correction made in the 'viii was the tak-
ing of $20,000.00 from her sister and giving it to Mrs. 
Howell and the children of Mrs. Schneider. 
Of course, persons other than the testatrix may have 
concluded that she had made a terrible mistake in the will 
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of 1946. Mrs. Parker expressed this thought in slightly 
different words to Mr. Mortensen when she urged him to 
contact her sister and have something done about it. 
In these circumstances, it is evident that even on June 
21, Miss Richards' mind had become so weakened that it 
could be bent in any direction. 
The codicil which was denied probate may properly be 
designated as a death-bed will. The following is a quotation 
from In re Costos' Will, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 306: 
"This instrument was a death bed will, made 
by a sick, suffering man. In an earl;v case, Kingstey 
v. Blanchard, 66 Barb. 317, 325, the Court said: 'The 
death-bed is not the place for closing up the affairs 
of this life. The mind enfeebled by disease-dis-
turbed by the grief of friends, by its care for those 
who must be left behind-agitated by the hopes and 
fears of the unknown and untried life beyond the 
grave-is not in a condition to weigh accurately the 
claims of children and friends on its bounty-to cast 
off the influence which kindness, or force or fear 
may have brought it under.' " 
~ Appellant's contention with respect to the sufficiency 
;: of the evidence to support the verdict is predicated upon the 
{ proposition that the opinion of Dr. C'urrier must be disre-
r garded. Instead of attempting to offer some plausible rea-
fi son why the opinion should be rejected, appellant merely 
~· reiterates the slander and abuse of Dr. Currier that appears 
tJ\ under Points 3 and 4 of the brief. This Doctor is emi-
nently well trained in the field of mental and nervous dis-
2r: eases, and is an instructor of psychiatry at our State Uni-
w· versity (R. 306-7). His opinion was predicated upon a state 
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of facts fully supported by the evidence. It is difficult to 
conceive how his conclusions could have been different from 
what they were. Appellant's counsel made no attempt to 
impair his opinion by cross-examination or by offering any 
contrary conclusion of a medical witness. 
Appellant intimates that Dr. Galligan expressed the 
opinion that the testatrix was of sound mind when the codi-
cil was signed. This is an incorrect appraisal of his testi-
mony. He expressly disqualified himself from rendering 
any such opinion (R. 285). Furthermore, his understand-
ing of what constitutes testamentary capacity was at var-
iance with the definitions of this court (R. 284). 
Appellant attempts to make something out of the state-
ments that the symptoms of diabetic coma and insulin shock 
are so dramatic that they would be evident to anyone. The 
difficulty of attaching any significance to these statements 
is that Dr. Galligan who made them was referring to the 
ordinary diabetic. He certainly was not referring to a 
bedridden dying woman who did not have the strength to 
hold a pen, or to a person who had so many episodes of 
diabetic coma and insulin shock that it was impossible to 
determine when one ended and the other began. 
Appellant argues that the opinions of the "highly com-
petent and indisputably honorable men" who attested the 
disputed document should be accepted as final. The same 
argument was addressed to the jury. This was proper, be-
cause the jury has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses. The opinion of Mr. Jones was 
predicated upon such a slight acquaintance with the testa-
trix that it was virtually without probative value. He had 
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never seen Miss Richards or talked to her prior to his visit 
to the hospital on June 25. He did not make any inquiry 
whatsoever concerning her mental condition, although he 
knew of her desperate illness and undoubtedly of Mr. 
Rawlins' experience on June 24. He did not contact her 
doctor, the nurses, the internes, or anyone else who would 
know whether or not she could make an intelligent disposi-
. tion of her property. He did not attempt to have Miss 
~ Richards express her wishes in her own words. He pro-
. ceeded rather to instruct her as to his understanding of her 
. wishes and to cross examine her to obtain her assent to the 
i 
terms of the document which had been drafted without her 
; knowledge and without consultation with her. It is not 
. necessary to go so far as to say that the jury would have 
been warranted in finding that Mr. Jones did not actually 
~entertain the opinion which he expressed. It is sufficient 
. to point out that the jury was not bound to accept his opin-
. ion. It must be remembered that Mr. Jones was acting as 
:. the attorney for the Walker Bank-not for Miss Richards 
~ -and that both he and the Bank stood to obtain a very sub-
); 
. stantial financial benefit if the codicil were sustained. 
The opinion of Mr. Carlson rests upon an even weaker 
·~foundation that that of Mr. Jones. Three days previously 
::he realized that the testatrix's condition was so precarious 
·~ ~~that she might pass away at any time. He accompanied 
•
1 
Mr. Rawlins to the hospital on June 24, and observed the 
'F ~~unsuccessful attempt of the testatrix to hold a pen. He saw 
~.her complete inability to perform any mental function or 
~·physical act. He heard Mr. Rawlins refuse to attest to her 
l~ capacity to make a will. How could he under these circum-
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stances believe that the testatrix was competent to make 
a will the next day when her condition had further deter .. 
iorated? 
The testimony of a subscribing witness must stand or 
fall upon the same basis as that of any other witness: 
"The subscribing witnesses to a will are not to 
be regarded as more or less truthful than other 
witnesses because they are subscribing witnesses. 
Valentine v. Second Baptist Church, 293 Ill. 71, 127 
N. E. 178. The testimony of such witnesses may be 
overcome by any competent evidence, and other evi .. 
dence, circumstantial as well as direct, may tend as 
effectually to impeach and discredit the evidence of 
attesting witnesses as would the formal presentation 
of witnesses who would avow that the attesting wit-
nesses had bad reputations for truth and veracity." 
Oliver v. Oliver, 340 Ill. 445, 172 N. E. 917, 923. 
Appellant seems to adopt the theory that the contested 
codicil was executed during a lucid interval, and that evi-
dence of the testatrix's incompetency before and after the 
moment of signing the contested codicil is not sufficient to 
overcome the testimony of the subscribing witnesses. A 
similar theory was advanced by the proponents of the will 
in Miller's Estate, 60 P. 2d 498, ... Cal. App .... , where 
the factual situation is strikingly similar to that in the 
present case. The court disposed of it in the following lan-
guage: 
"In the case at bar it is the contention of ap-
pellant that the will was drawn during a lucid in· 
terval. However, the court found differently, and, 
while this testimony raised a conflict, the evidence 
of the respondents justified the finding of the lower 
court. 
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"It is true that neither physical or mental weak-
ness will necessarily invalidate a will. They are, 
however circumstances to be considered together 
with all other facts surrounding the execution of 
the will in determining testatrix's testamentary ca-
pacity. In re Estate of Alexander, 111 Cal. App. 1, 
295 P. 53. 
"Proof of the sanity of the testator and of the 
facts upon which his state of mind depends are not 
necessarily confined to the exact time of the execu-
tion of the will. Evidence of the testator's mental 
status, together with his appearance, conduct, acts, 
habits, and conversation, both before and after the 
execution of the will, are admissible so long as they 
have a reasonable tendency to indicate his mental 
condition at the time of the execution of the will. 
In re Estate of Alexander, supra; In re Estate of 
Baker, 176 Cal. 430, 168 P. 881." 
, The cases cited in appellant's brief announce correct 
- principles of the law with respect to capacity to make a 
~ valid will. However, none of those cases contain facts com-
~ parable to those in the present ·case, and cannot, therefore, 
,. be regarded as precedents. Admittedly, old age, eccentrici-
~· ties, and physical infirmity do not alone render a person 
·incapable of making a valid will. But here we have all of 
' these debilities plus a complication of severe and incurable 
:t. diseases which have all but completely destroyed the tes-
~ tatrix' s mind and body. 
The only Utah case in which the facts are at all similar 
:~is In re McCoy's Estate, 91 Utah 212, 63 P. 2d 620. Here 
:~:was involved a death-bed will which the trial court found 
i~to be invalid because of lack of testamentary capacity. The 
W'will was signed on December 25, and the testatrix died five 
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days later. She was ninety-two years of age, and on Decem-
ber 25, was very sick, and in a greatly weakened condition. 
She was in pain and was awake only at intervals. When 
food was placed in her mouth, she did not react in any 
manner. Prior to her last illness, she apparently had been 
active and in full possesion of her faculties, except as they 
may have been normally affected by advancing age. This 
court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the 
finding of the trial court that Mrs. McCoy was incompetent 
at the time the will was signed. 
In re Albertson's Estate, ... Calif. 2d ... , 87 P. 2d 
883, the testatrix was seventy years of age when the will 
in question was drawn. She died eleven days later. She 
suffered from arteriosclerosis, and enlargement of the 
heart, and other diseases. The arteriosclerosis and the dis-
eased heart had produced the same effect upon her mental 
processes as were manifest in Miss Richards' case. The 
court held there was sufficient evidence to support the 
finding of the trial court of a lack of testamentary capacity. 
In McCartney v. Holmquist, 106 F. 2d 855, the codicil 
in question was signed on August 26, and the testatrix died 
the following December 9. For a period of several weeks 
prior to the execution of the codicil, she had been extremely 
ill, suffering from arteriosclerosis, enlargement of the 
heart, and other diseases. It appeared that she suffered con-
siderable pain and was extremely weak. Her conversation 
was muddled and rambling. The late Judge Stephens ap-
proved for the court the action of the trial judge rejecting 
the codicil upon the ground of incon1petency. 
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The evidence in the case at bar of a lack of testamen-
tary capacity is much stronger than that offered in any 
of the cases cited herein or in the appellant's brief. The 
diseases with which the testatrix was afflicted were such 
as to directly injure the brain and impair her mental facul-
ties. The uncontrollable diabetes produced a state of coma. 
· When given insulin to counteract the excessive sugar in the 
· blood, it produced shock, the end result of which was also 
: coma. She fluctuated between these two types of coma. 
The lucid intervals between them became rarer and shorter 
: until they virtually disappeared during the last ten days 
. of her life. 
The congestive heart failure with its consequent back-
: flow of blood caused the accumulation of fluid in the lungs, 
: which in turn produced a condition of stupor. Because of 
~ the inability of the diseased heart to pump the necessary 
:. volume of blood, the brain cells suffered from a lack of 
r oxygen. 
The ravages of these diseases reduced the testatrix to 
~ a mental state below that required to make a valid will. 
The verdict of the jury is fully sustained by the evi-
. dence and should be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GRANT H. BAGLEY, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
WILLIAM S. WHITE, 
WHITE, KLUTE & WHITE, 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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